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BY TEREZA KOBELKOVA 
As China accrues ever greater geopoliƟcal weight, its Belt and Road IniƟaƟve (BRI) is a major step 
forward in enhancing its internaƟonal power and presƟge. InternaƟonal commentators have 
focused on the potenƟal gains that the iniƟaƟve oﬀers to China. However, as BRI involves large 
investments in developing and poliƟcally unstable countries, there are great risks of investment 
losses arising from the iniƟaƟve. As a result, an increasing number of Chinese companies and 
experts have expressed grave concerns over BRI’s impact on their country’s economy. It is puzzling 
that a tradiƟonally pragmaƟc state such as China would pursue this iniƟaƟve despite the risks, 
raising quesƟons about the raƟonale behind BRI. However, regardless of the economic and poliƟcal 
risks involved, connecƟon to trade routes and natural resources represent important pragmaƟc 
reasons to pursue BRI. 
 
Out of the 68 countries that have joined and signed the BRI, the majority are developing economies 
with small markets and high foreign debt.  As major investors in the iniƟaƟve, Chinese state‐owned 
companies are set to provide approximately $122 billion in loans to the BRI, without any guarantee 
that the small economies will be able to manage the loan scheme and repay their debts.  
 
The potenƟal loss of mass investment is concerning for Chinese investors. As highlighted in a recent 
report of the United NaƟons Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), 
large foreign loans to countries with underdeveloped financial markets may deteriorate their trade 
balance. Risks that a macroeconomic instability will deprive these small economies of the ability to 
repay such loans generates sharp apprehensions within China’s broader investment community. As 
the vice president of a unit within China CommunicaƟons ConstrucƟon Company, a BRI investor, 
recently stated: “We have paid great price and suﬀered big losses... There are more than 200 
countries and regions in the world, and not every place is worth investment.”  
 
Two risks are paramount in generaƟng such concerns. First, Chinese enterprises can suﬀer 
investment loss due to debtor inability to repay loans, as has unfolded in the cases of Sri Lanka and 
Myanmar. Consequently, Beijing realized that ignoring complexiƟes in host countries can lead to 
backlash from local populaƟons, or in governments revoking Chinese projects or imposing a cap on 
permiƩed investments. There is no reason to expect that the BRI should be any diﬀerent unless 
China adapts to evolving local and naƟonal dynamics. 
 
A second concern relates to the poliƟcal unrest in some of the countries BRI is projected to traverse, 
which aﬀects their ability to repay loans. Some of these countries — such as Syria, Afganistan, 
Yemen, and Pakistan — are notoriously poliƟcally unstable. According to the Centre for China and 
GlobalizaƟon, one quarter of 120 cases of unsuccessful investments have been due to poliƟcal 
unrest. PoliƟcal turmoil alongside the inability of host countries to repay their loans will seriously 
impact the eﬀecƟveness of the BRI. 
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This raises the quesƟon as to why a tradiƟonally pragmaƟc country, such as China,  would not 
rather focus its investment iniƟaƟves more directly on strong economies where the chances of 
returning profits are considerably safer? In this context, many foreign policy analysts argue that 
BRI is poliƟcally moƟvated but merely disguised as an economic iniƟaƟve. Closer analysis reveals 
this may not be the case either.  
 
The poliƟcal dimension of BRI relates to China gaining greater leverage over its developing 
investment partners. The inability of small economies to repay their loans will increase Chinese 
control over them. China has already discovered that exerƟng such leverage and pressing debtors 
to consent to Chinese deals enables Beijing to exercise greater influence over parƟcular projects 
or faciliƟes (such as ports, industrial zones, and control over strategic landmarks). However, 
China has also learned that such an outcome can lead to backlash within recipient states and 
populaces. This was the case in Myanmar, which, aŌer many years of dealing with the Chinese 
under a highly autocraƟc government controlled by its military subsequently opened up to the 
world and engaged with the US as a means to counterbalance Chinese influence. Similar backlash 
can also be seen in Sri Lanka, when public demonstraƟons against that country’s deals with China 
briefly delayed the Colombo Port City project and resulted in the Sri Lankan government re‐
establishing Ɵes with India at some cost to China. 
 
MounƟng pressure over the debtor country therefore does not necessarily provide space for 
poliƟcal leverage. On the contrary, in the cases menƟoned above, growing debt and Chinese 
pressure triggered counter acƟons to balance the growing Chinese influence.  Acknowledging 
these alarming signs, it is surprising that a strategic, tradiƟonally pragmaƟc China conƟnues to 
expand the BRI. One cannot but quesƟon the BRI decision. What is the ‘pragmaƟc’ intenƟon 
behind BRI, given that the uncertain gains from this strategy leave even Chinese experts puzzled? 
Is Beijing about to repeat the same ‘poliƟcal’ mistakes it made in Myanmar and Sri Lanka or is 
there another strong raƟonale driving BRI?  
 
In the short term, Chinese enterprises with foreign‐based BRI projects are in the front line to bear 
the costs. Civil unrest, poliƟcal change, and debt crises in host countries are all factors which may 
contribute to the loss of investments and cause severe damage to the funcƟonality of Chinese 
companies, with a potenƟal impact on the overall Chinese economy. In the long term, however, 
there are strategic reasons for China to conƟnue the BRI regardless of the uncertainƟes 
surrounding its short‐term economic and poliƟcal benefits. For example, China will sƟll end up 
with an advanced transport infrastructure established across Asia. Prospects are strong that this 
will facilitate trade and the import of natural resources, giving China the opƟon to diversify its 
resources via new alternaƟve routes of access. For a country of more than a billion people and 
mounƟng pressure on natural resources, any such outcome is worth incurring calculated risks. 
 
Over Ɵme, a strategy incorporaƟng reasonable risk from China’s perspecƟve could prove to be 
pragmaƟc. In a world where scrambling for resources is a key reality, China is ensuring that it 
retains access to trade routes and increases its access to natural resources. Despite the many 
issues surrounding the adverƟsed economic and poliƟcal dynamics of BRI, this strategy ‘for the 
common good of the country’ promises fully developed transportaƟon infrastructure across the 
Eurasian conƟnent. If successful, the outcome would be diversificaƟon and establishment of 
alternaƟve resource and trade routes connecƟng China with the rest of the world. This — 
coupled with an aversion to losing face — is a strong enough raƟonale for Beijing to pursue the 
BRI energeƟcally and with a long‐term view of its benefits. 
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